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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308b (1975), which gives the Court authority to review probate 
proceedings under the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
IS APPELLANT HAROLD HUPE AS THE PERSON WITH STATUTORY 
PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR LITIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN 
GOOD FAITH TO PROBATE AN APPARENTLY INTESTATE ESTATE AND 
DEFEND IT AGAINST AN ALLEGED LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT LATER ADMITTED TO PROBATE? 
The sole issue in this case is whether the Appellant Harold F. Hupe ("Harold Hupe"), the 
person with priority for appointment as personal representative and a person nominated as 
personal representative under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, is entitled to reimbursement by 
the estate of his deceased son Jamie Peter Hupe for attorney fees incurred in bringing the estate 
into probate and defending the intestate estate against an alleged testamentary instrument that 
was later admitted into probate. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue concerns the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. "The 
trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for correctness without 
deference." Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.. 836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also Ward 
v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 
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1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). "The standard of review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule or 
statute is correctness. . . . When reviewing legal determinations, an appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State 
v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court's denial of 
necessary fees and expenses in this case should be reviewed for correctness. 
This issue was raised below in Harold Hupe's Motion for Attorney Fees and Motion to 
Reconsider Denial of Attorney Fees. See Addendum at A1-A3 and A39-A46. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (UUPC), Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-1-101 to -8-101, are dispositive of this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102. Purposes - Rule of construction. 
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, 
missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution 
of his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate 
of the decedent and making distributions to his successors; 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and 
(e) to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203. Priority among persons seeking appointment as 
personal representative. 
(1) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons who are not 
disqualified have priority for appointment in the following order: 
(a) the person with priority as determined by a probated will, including a 
person nominated by a power conferred in a will; 
259707.1 
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(b) the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee of the decedent; 
(c) other devisees of the decedent; 
(d) the surviving spouse of the decedent; 
(e) other heirs of the decedent; 
(f) forty-five days after the death of the decedent, any creditor. 
(2) An objection to an appointment can be made only in formal proceedings. In 
case of objection the priorities stated in Subsection (1) apply except that: 
(a) If the estate appears to be more than adequate to meet exemptions and 
costs of administration but inadequate to discharge anticipated 
unsecured claims, the court, on petition of creditors, may appoint any 
qualified person; 
(b) In case of objection to appointment of a person other than one whose 
priority is determined by will by an heir or devisee appearing to have a 
substantial interest in the estate, the court may appoint a person who is 
acceptable to heirs and devisees whose interests in the estate appear to 
be worth in total more than one-half of the probable distributable 
value, or, in default of this accord, any suitable person. 
(3) A person entitled to letters under Subsections 1(b) through 1(f) and a person 
aged 18 and over who would be entitled to letters but for his age, may 
nominate a qualified person to act as personal representative. Any person 
aged 18 and over may renounce his right to nominate or to an appointment by 
appropriate writing filed with the court. When two or more persons share a 
priority, those of them who do not renounce must concur in nominating 
another to act for them or in applying for appointment in informal 
proceedings. Before appointing fewer than all persons who share a priority 
and who have not renounced or nominated another, the court must determine 
that those sharing the priority, although given notice of the formal 
proceedings, have failed to request the appointment or to nominate another for 
appointment, and that administration is necessary. 
(4) Conservators of the estates of protected persons, or if there is not conservator, 
any guardian, except a guardian ad litem of a minor or incapacitated person, 
may exercise the same right to nominate, to object to another's appointment, 
or to participate in determining the preference of a majority in interest of the 
heirs and devisees that the protected person or ward would have if qualified 
for appointment. 
(5) Appointment of one who does not have priority under Subsection (1) or 
priority resulting from renunciation or nomination determined pursuant to this 
section may be made only in formal proceedings. Before appointing one 
without priority, the court must determine that those having priority, although 
given notice of the proceedings, have failed to request appointment or to 
nominate another for appointment, and that administration is necessary. 
(6) No person is qualified to serve as a personal representative who is: 
(a) under the age of 21; 
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(b) a person whom the court finds unsuitable in formal proceedings. 
(7) A personal representative appointed by a court of the decedent's domicile has 
priority over all other persons except where the decedent's will nominates 
different persons to be personal representative in this state and in the state of 
domicile. The domiciliary personal representative may nominate another, 
who shall have the same priority as the domiciliary personal representative. 
(8) This section governs priority for appointment of a successor personal 
representative but does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. Expenses in estate litigation. 
If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves Harold Hupe's entitlement to attorneys fees for litigating in probate 
his son's apparently intestate estate and defending the estate against a claim of an alleged lost 
holographic will. Although the trial court ultimately accepted the lost holographic will and 
admitted it to probate, Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorneys fees because he was the nominated 
personal representative and litigated the issue in good faith. 
II. Course of Proceedings/Disposition Below 
Harold Hupe filed a motion and supporting memorandum in the trial court requesting 
attorneys fees. See Addendum at A1-A13. After briefing, the trial court denied the motion. Id. 
at A33-A36. Harold Hupe then filed a motion to reconsider. Id. at A39-A46. After briefing, the 
trial court summarily denied that motion. Id. at A55. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The decedent, Jamie Peter Hupe, died with no issue and with no spouse. He was 
survived by his father Harold Hupe and by three brothers, including Appellee Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
("Jeff Hupe"). As the father of decedent, Harold Hupe was his sole heir at law. See Addendum 
atAl,A4,A5. 
2. Six months after decedent's death, Harold Hupe filed a petition for informal 
probate on the understanding that his son had died intestate. Id. at Al, A4, A41. Jeff Hupe knew 
of the decedent's death as he had been the decedent's main caretaker during his final illness. 
However, Jeff Hupe did not announce the existence of a will or initiate probate in the first six 
months after the decedent's death. Id. at A4, A5, A26, A41. Thus, when Harold Hupe filed his 
petition for probate Jeff Hupe was not even an interested person with standing to participate in 
decedent's probate in intestacy under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(24) (1998 Supp.) or to 
nominate a personal representative under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203 (1975). Harold Hupe was 
therefore the only person with standing to initiate probate and nominate himself or a third party 
as the decedent's personal representative under the intestacy laws of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code. 
3. After Harold Hupe filed for informal probate, nominating himself as the 
decedent's personal representative, Jeff Hupe contested the probate petition. Id. at A5, A26. Jeff 
Hupe alleged that the decedent had made a holographic will naming Jeff Hupe as his sole heir 
and personal representative. Id. Jeff Hupe never produced this will, and he could not identify 
the two witnesses who had attested to the alleged will. Id. Furthermore, Jeff Hupe himself 
5 
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maintained that the alleged holographic will was last seen in the decedent's possession. Id. This 
fact created a statutory presumption that the decedent had repudiated the will by destroying it. 
See Estate of Wheadon. 579 P.2d 930, 931 (Utah 1978) ("A well-established presumption of law 
exists as follows: when it is shown that the testator made a will of which he had possession, or 
access to, but that it could not be found at his death, the law presumes the testator destroyed it 
himself, with the intent of revoking it.") 
4. After trial on the challenge to Harold Hupe's petition, the district court ultimately 
found that the holographic will had been lost rather than destroyed by the decedent, and it 
admitted the lost will to probate based on the testimony of Jeff Hupe and other witnesses to the 
lost will's contents. Id. at A5. As a result of these findings, the trial court denied Harold Hupe's 
petition for appointment as personal representative and appointed appellee as the decedent's 
personal representative under the newly admitted will. Id. 
5. Following this order, Harold Hupe requested an award of attorney fees for his 
expenses in initiating and pursuing the probate proceeding. Id. at A1-A3. The trial court denied 
Harold Hupe's request. Id. at A33-A36. The trial court denied this motion on the grounds that 
Harold Hupe was not entitled to collect attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (1971) 
because he was not the personal representative nominated in decedent's will. Id. Harold Hupe 
then filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Attorney Fees. Id. at A39-46. The trial court denied 
the motion to reconsider. Id. at A55. 
259707.1 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorneys fees because he was nominated as a personal 
representative of his deceased son's estate and defended the estate in good faith against a claim of 
a lost holographic will. The award of attorney fees under these circumstances is an issue of first 
impression in Utah. This is likely because Section 75-3-719 of the UUPC is clear on its face. 
The provision states: "If any personal representative or person nominated as personal 
representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including 
reasonable attorney fees incurred." IcL Despite this provision, the trial court concluded that 
Harold Hupe was not entitled to attorney fees in this case because, since Jeff Hupe's challenge 
was ultimately successful, Harold Hupe was never actually appointed as the decedent's personal 
representative. This conclusion contradicts the plain language of Section 75-3-719 and 
undermines the fundamental legislative purpose of the UUPC. 
Harold Hupe was a "person nominated as personal representative" as contemplated by 
Sections 75-3-203 and 75-3-719 of the UUPC. Harold Hupe incurred his attorney fees and other 
expenses by initiating probate proceedings as the decedent's sole heir at law and hence as the 
sole statutory nominee. He defended the intestate estate against Jeff Hupe's challenge. Harold 
Hupe took both actions in good faith; he initiated probate six months after the decedent's death 
on the reasonable assumption that the decedent had died intestate. He then defended decedent's 
estate against a challenge based on the alleged prior existence of an holographic will that was last 
seen in the decedent's possession and which was never found after his death. This challenge was 
ultimately successful because the trial court found that decedent had not destroyed the will and 
7 
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that there was sufficient evidence of its contents for it to be admitted into probate. However, 
Section 75-3-719 states that the nominee personal representatives is entitled to fees and expenses 
for "any action, whether successful or not." Id. Thus, the trial court's denial of Harold Hupe's 
attorney fees was in error. 
Furthermore, the trial court's denial of attorneys fees creates significant problems in light 
of the language and legislative intent of Section 75-3-719. First, the denial of Harold Hupe's 
attorney fees contradicts this Section's mandate that attorney fees will be awarded for "any 
proceeding in good faith, regardless of whether successful or not..." Second, denial of his 
attorneys fees contravenes the established principle of probate law that litigants in probate 
proceedings are entitled to reimbursement from the estate or other heirs for any expenses 
incurred to further probate of the estate as a whole. See e.g.. Estate of Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 826 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between fees incurred to contest for a share of an estate and 
fees incurred to probate or otherwise benefit an estate as a whole). Third, denial of attorneys fees 
in this case discriminates between testate and intestate estates by stripping the statutorily 
prioritized representatives of intestate estates of the protection against personal liability for 
probate expenses that has been built into the UUPC. Finally, this decision creates a disincentive 
for relatives to serve as personal representatives because of the risk that a subsequent challenge 
will leave them personally liable for probate costs. This disincentive threatens the UUPCs 
primary purpose, which is to encourage probate proceedings as the preferred means "to discover 
and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." Utah Code Ann. § 
75-l-102(b)(1996). 
259707.1 
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For these reasons, this Court should vacate the trial court's Order denying attorneys fees 
and remand this case for a determination of reasonable attorneys fees. 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was based on a misunderstanding of the role of 
fees and expenses awarded in probate proceedings. Thus, before addressing the specific issues 
involved in Harold Hupe's case, it is necessary to examine briefly the structure and legislative 
goals of the UUPC. 
The statutory mechanism through which state-supervised distribution of decedents' 
property is accomplished is the probate process. The alternative to this process is distribution, 
without court supervision, in which the distribution of decedents' property is determined without 
supervision by the individuals who happen to have control of the property at the time of death. 
Such unofficial and unsupervised distributions are susceptible to serious abuses, and the probate 
system was designed to prevent them. Thus, a primary goal of the UUPC and other probate 
codes is to encourage survivors and interested parties to distribute decedents' property through 
the probate process. 
The personal representative plays an indispensable role in the probate process. In order 
for a probate to be initiated, an interested person must petition for probate and accept 
appointment as personal representative. Thus, provisions for awards of attorneys fees and other 
probate expenses to personal representatives play a central role in promoting initiation of probate 
proceedings. A fundamental tenet of the probate system is that a decedent's estate must 
reimburse the personal representative for all costs associated with probating and otherwise 
9 
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administering an estate. This tenet rests on common law notions of equity, but is also 
fundamental to the structure of the UUPC. 
For these reasons, an award of attorneys fees to a personal representative under the UUPC 
involves very different considerations of equity and public policy from those which govern an 
award of attorney fees under most other statutes. Most statutes authorizing attorney fees are 
designed to discourage meritless litigation by awarding fees to the prevailing party. In contrast, 
award of fees in probate proceedings is designed to encourage probate proceedings by insuring 
that, absent bad faith, individual participants will bear the cost of those proceedings only in 
proportion to the benefit that they actually receive from the estate itself. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS THE PERSON WITH STATUTORY PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, HAROLD HUPE IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR LITIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN GOOD FAITH TO 
PROBATE THE APPARENTLY INTESTATE ESTATE AND DEFEND IT 
AGAINST AN ALLEGED LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT LATER ADMITTED TO PROBATE 
A, Harold Hupe is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under the Plain Language of Section 
75-3-719 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Which Establishes That Personal 
Representatives or Nominee Personal Representatives are Entitled to 
Reimbursement of the Costs of Any Proceeding Undertaken in Good Faith, 
Whether Successful or Not 
Harold Hupe is entitled to attorneys fees under the plain language of Section 75-3-719 of 
the UUPC because he incurred these fees in good faith as the statutorily nominated personal 
representative of decedent's intestate estate. Section 75-3-719 states: "If any personal 
representative or person nominated as a personal representative defends or prosecutes any 
259707.1 
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proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his 
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees incurred." Id. 
1. Harold Hupe Was a Person Nominated As Personal Representative Under the 
UUPC 
Harold Hupe was clearly a "person nominated as personal representative" as 
contemplated in Sections 75-3-203 and 75-3-719 cf the UUPC. As the decedent's only heir in 
intestacy, Harold Hupe was the sole person with priority for appointment as personal 
representative under Section 75-3-203(1) of the UUPC. Persons with priority for appointment 
under the intestacy provisions may "nominate a qualified person to act as personal 
representative." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203(3). Persons may nominate themselves, and the 
process through which such nomination occurs is the filing of a petition for probate and 
appointment of personal representative. Thus, when Harold Hupe, the only person with priority 
for appointment under the statute in the case of intestacy, filed a petition for appointment as 
personal representative nominating himself, he clearly became a person "nominated as personal 
representative" under Section 75-3-719. Consequently, Harold Hupe was "entitled to receive 
from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred." Id. 
The trial court appears to have assumed that Harold Hupe was not a person nominated as 
personal representative because he was not the personal representative allegedly appointed in 
decedent's lost holographic will. However, this assumption conflicts with the use of the term 
"nominated" in Section 75-3-203. 
259707.1 
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2. Harold Hupe Participated in the Probate Proceeding Below in Good Faith 
Harold Hupe also participated in the proceedings below in good faith. He did not file his 
petition for informal probate and appointment of personal representative until six months after 
decedent's death, at which time it was more than reasonable to assume that any heirs under any 
will of decedent would have come forward with their claims. Furthermore, Jeff Hupe's 
challenge, while ultimately endorsed by the trial court, was certainly subject to a good faith 
challenge and serious scrutiny by the trial court. Jeff Hupe's claim was based on a lost 
holographic will to which Jeff Hupe could produce no witnesses. Also, the claim had to 
overcome both the presumption against admitting a holographic will based solely on witness 
testimony and the presumption that a lost will last seen in a decedent's possession was destroyed 
by the decedent himself and has therefore been repudiated. Thus, Harold Hupe is entitled to his 
expenses and attorney fees under the plain language of Section 75-3-719. 
3. Harold Hupe Incurred These Fees in His Capacity as Personal Representative and Not 
in His Capacity as a Claimant of the Estate 
Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorney fees and other expenses because he incurred them 
in his capacity as the decedent's personal representative and not in his capacity as a claimant of 
the estate. Under Section 75-1-201(24) of the UUPC, standing to participate in probate 
proceedings is limited to persons "with a financial interest founded on or defeated by" the 
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(24). Thus, every personal representative necessarily 
wears two hats by statutory requirement: one hat as a potential heir whose claims may conflict 
259707.1 
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with those of other heirs, and a second hat as a fiduciary of the estate with the responsibility to 
probate and fairly administer the estate in accordance with the decedent's testamentary 
instructions. 
It is well-established that probate participants, regardless of their personal interest in the 
proceeds of an estate, are entitled to all fees and expenses incurred in their capacity as personal 
representative. See, e.g.. Estate of Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(distinguishing between a personal representatives role "as personal representative" and her role 
"as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs of the estate"). No Utah case has 
defined the line of demarcation between a participant's actions as personal representative and a 
participant's actions as a potential heir of the estate. However, cases in other jurisdictions have 
distinguished between actions taken to establish, defend or distribute a decedent's estate and 
actions taken to resolve disputes between heirs about the relative amounts of their inheritances 
under testamentary instruments. See, e.g.. Estate of Foster. 699 P.2d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1985 (distinguishing disputes over validity of a will and cases where "the issue was how the will 
disposed of the property"). 
Harold Hupe's actions in this case were clearly the actions of a personal representative. 
He initiated probate of the estate, nominated himself as personal representative, and defended the 
estate against a challenge based on an alleged will that was presumed to be repudiated by the 
decedent under Utah case law. These actions were either necessary administrative prerequisites 
to probating the estate or appropriate fiduciary measures of a personal representative whose 
responsibility was to ensure that the decedent's testamentary wishes were made effective. Thus, 
259707.1 
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Harold Hupe is entitled to reimbursement from the estate for the fees and other expenses arising 
from these actions. 
4. Harold Hupe Is Entitled to Attorneys Fees Regardless of Whether He Was 
Successful 
Finally, the trial court appears to have assumed that since Harold Hupe's petition for 
probate and appointment of personal representative was not granted, Harold Hupe is not entitled 
to fees. However, this conclusion directly contradicts the language of Section 75-3-719, which 
mandates award of fees to persons nominated as personal representative who "defends or 
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not." IcL The trial court denied 
Harold Hupe's fees for the sole reason that because his action in defense of the intestate estate 
was unsuccessful, he was not appointed as decedent's personal representative. This decision 
amounts to a holding that nominated personal representatives of intestate estates will not be 
awarded expenses and attorney fees unless their actions in probate court are successful. Thus, it 
renders meaningless this Section's entitlement to fees for actions undertaken in good faith 
"whether successful or not." Id, 
B. Denial of Harold Hupe's Attorneys Fees Undermines the Primary Legislative 
Purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code by Depriving Representatives of 
Intestate Estates of the Protections Afforded by the Code And Thereby Creating 
a Disincentive for Parties to Bring Intestate Estates Forward for Probate 
Denial of Harold Hupe's attorneys fees also undermines the legislative goals and 
structure of the UUPC. As noted above, a primary purpose of the UUPC is "to discover and 
make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property" by bringing estates into 
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probate instead of allowing individuals to conduct unsupervised distributions. Utah Code Ann. § 
75-l-102(b)(1996). 
The UUPC encourages interested parties to initiate probate proceedings by offering a 
number of statutory protections in exchange for the parties' participation. These protections 
include the assurance that attorneys fees and other expenses created by a decedent's estate will be 
born by the estate itself rather than by parties who expend their own money in order to initiate 
and move forward probate proceedings. 
This legislative goal creates a functional difference between awards of necessary fees and 
expenses in probate proceedings and awards of attorneys fees in other types of civil proceedings. 
Whereas awards of fees in other civil proceedings are part of the courts' arsenal of discretionary 
sanctions, awards of necessary fees and expenses in probate proceedings are designed to 
encourage initiation of probate proceedings by guaranteeing that the costs of probating an estate 
will be born by the estate itself and not by the individuals who spend their own money to initiate 
or pursue probate of the estate. 
The unusual function of fee awards in probate proceedings is reflected in the language of 
Section 75-3-719. Unlike other attorney fees provisions, Section 75-3-719 does not grant the 
trial court discretion to determine whether to award attorney fees. Rather, it states that personal 
representatives and persons nominated as personal representatives who engage in good faith 
actions are "entitled to receive from the estate . . . necessary expenses and disbursements, 
including reasonable attorney fees incurred." Id. This language reflects the two fundamental 
tenets of fees awards in the context of probate proceedings. First, that the estate itself should 
bear all the costs of probate, including extraordinary probate costs that are necessitated by a 
15 
259707.1 
decedent's failure to leave clear testamentary instructions. Second, that the costs of probate 
should ultimately be born on a pro rata basis by the individual heirs who actually receive the 
property at issue in the probate proceeding. 
C. Denial of Harold Hupe's Attorney Fees Offends Basic Principles of Equity 
Because His Actions Conferred Benefit on the Estate as a Whole and the Estate 
Should Be Required to Reimburse Him for This Benefit and Because Equity 
Demands That the Decedent's Estate Bear the Burden of the Decedent's Own 
Failure to Leave a Clear Record of His Testamentary Purpose 
Basic principles of equity also support Harold Hupe's right to reimbursement for attorney 
fees incurred to probate this estate. "Unless displaced by particular provisions of [the UUPC], 
the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-1-3 (1975). 
These principles, as well as the case law specific to probate proceedings, support Harold Hupe's 
claim for reimbursement from the estate for his necessary expenses. 
The probate process imposes specific, unavoidable expenses on participants. These 
expenses include the costs and attorneys fees required for filing a petition for probate, providing 
public notice of probate proceedings, and preparing for and attending probate hearings. When 
these expenditures confer a benefit on the estate as a whole, it is well-established that the estate, 
and not the personal representative, should bear the burden of paying for them. See Estate of 
Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between fees incurred as 
personal representative and fees incurred "as a claimant with interests that conflict with other 
heirs to the estate"); In re Yonk's Estate. 195 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah 1948) (stating that even a 
stranger to the estate appointed over the protest of heirs is entitled to reimbursement for "the 
reasonable value of services performed"). 
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Harold Hupe was not a stranger to the estate. Rather, he was the decedent's sole heir at 
law at the time he filed his petition and was therefore the only person with standing to petition 
for probate or nominate a personal representative. Harold Hupe's actions conferred significant 
benefits on the estate by initiating probate and by defending the estate against an allegedly lost 
testamentary instrument that faced a legal presumption of invalidity under current Utah case law. 
See Estate of Foster. 699 P.2d 638, 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) ("'The services of counsel in 
preventing distribution under invalid instruments must be held to confer a benefit upon the 
estate.'") (quoting In Re Estate of Katschor. 637 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1981)). Equitable principles 
demand that the estate should repay Harold Hupe, who has received nothing from the estate, for 
these benefits, and that he should not bear any part of the costs of probate. 
CONCLUSION 
Harold Hupe was a person nominated as personal representative under the intestacy 
provisions of the UUPC. He incurred attorney fees and expenses in the proceedings below in 
good faith. He incurred these fees in his capacity as the nominated personal representative rather 
than in his capacity as a claimant under the Utah intestacy provisions. Harold Hupe conferred a 
substantial benefit on the estate by initiating probate and by defending the estate against a claim 
that, though ultimately successful, warranted serious scrutiny. The language and legislative 
goals of the UUPC dictate that the decedent's estate, rather than Harold Hupe, should bear the 
cost of these proceedings. Furthermore, basic principles of equity demand that the estate should 
reimburse Harold Hupe for the benefit he conferred on it. 
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For all the reasons stated above, the district court's Order should be reversed and this 
Court should remand to the district court with directions to award a reasonable attorneys fee. 
DATED this J°_ day of March, 1999. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
PAT&Cft D. WHITE 7) 
ELIZABETH CONLEY W 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT was served on Cross-Petitioner and Appellee by mailing two true copies thereof to 
his attorney of record, by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, this /&** day of March, 1999, in an 
envelope addressed as follows: 
Leslie Van Franck 
Cohne Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South #500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Elizabeft'Conley (/ 
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
JN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JAMIE HUPE 
Deceased. 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. 973300019 ES 
******* 
Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe") by and through his attorneys moves for an award of 
attorneys fees from the estate of Jamie Hupe. 
Mr. Hupe, as apparent sole intestate heir filed for the probate of Jamie Hupe's 
estate and defended the estate in trial against proponents of a lost holographic will. 
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Attorneys Fees Mr. Hupe as nominee personal representative acting in good faith should be 
awarded attorneys fees in determining the disposition of the decedent's estate. 
216085.1 
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DATED this Z'&l day of June, 1998. 
4 
ELIZABETH S. CONLEY< 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ceftify that on the _2j2eUlay of June, 1998, I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the 
following: 
Leslie Van Frank, Esq. 
COflNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
£L*£JU£&> Qto&toJ 
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JAMIE HUPE 
Deceased. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. 973300019 ES 
******* 
Harold Hupe, by and through his counsel, submits the following MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
INTRODUCTION 
Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe") seeks relief from this Court for expenses he incurred on behalf 
of the estate of Jamie Hupe. Jamie Hupe, a single man with no children, died on October 11, 
1996. IDs estate consisted primarily of an annuity which listed his estate as the beneficiary. No 
will was presented for probate and Mr. Hupe filed petition for informal probate with an 
application for Informal Personal Representative. 
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As Jamie's father, Mr. Hupe is Jamie's sole intestate heir and under Utah law is the 
nominee personal representative of Jamie's estate. Therefore, unless and until an alternate 
personal representative was assigned Mr. Hupe had a fiduciary duty to administer Jamie Hupe's 
estate. After Mr. Hupe filed his petition, Jeff Hupe, one of Jamie Hupe's three brothers, filed an 
Objection to the Petition and petitioned to admit a lost will into probate. Jeff Hupe submitted 
affidavits from two of his friends stating that they had seen the lost will and that the material 
provisions were in decedent's handwriting and was signed by the decedent. The lost will was 
reported to be a form will witnessed by two persons and affixed with a notary seal. No witness to 
the lost will was named or came forward. Neither of the witnesses who said they saw the lost will 
recalled the names of the witnesses to the lost will or the notary, the date of the lost will or the 
place it was made. 
The matter was brought to the probate court to determine whether the proponents of the 
lost will presented sufficient evidence that such a will had existed; that it fulfilled the requirements 
of a valid will; what its dispositive provisions said; and that there was sufficient evidence to 
overcome the presumption that the will had been revoked. Mr. Hupe defended the Objection and 
after he submitted a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of witnesses to the will, JeflF 
Hupe presented a cross motion for summary judgment on the basis that the lost will was a 
holographic will. Mr. Hupe withdrew his motion and the court denied Jeff Hupe's cross motion 
and the matter went to trial. After trial, the court admitted the lost will to probate and did not 
appoint Mr. Hupe as personal representative. Nevertheless, Mr. Hupe is entitled to compensation 
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for the reasonable expenses he incurred while administering the estate because he served the 
estate in good faith in fulfilling his fiduciary duty as the nominee personal representative. 
ARGUMENT 
L UNDER UTAH LAW, MIL HUPE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE 
ESTATE OF JAMIE HUPE BECAUSE HE INCURRED HIS EXPENSES IN GOOD FAITH 
WHILE PERFORMING HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS THE NOMINEE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE. 
Utah law entitles Mr. Hupe to recover the expenses he incurred in good faith while serving 
Jamie Hupe's estate as nominated personal representative. The Utah Probate Code states, "If any 
personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any 
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his 
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-719 (1997). Mr. Hupe is entitled to compensation for his expenses under Utah law 
because he is a person nominated as personal representative and he performed his services in good 
faith. 
Utah law prefers the intestate heir when appointing a personal representative to the estate. 
Mr. Hupe acted as a nominee personal representative in serving the estate of Jamie Hupe. The 
Utah Probate Code states (in pertinent part) as follows: 
75-3-203. Priority among persons seeking appointment as personal 
representative. 
(1) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons 
who are not disqualified have priority for appointment in the 
following order: 
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(a) the person with priority as determined by a probated 
will, including a person nominated by a power 
conferred in a will; 
(b) the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a 
devisee of the decedent; 
(c) other devisees of the decedent; 
(d) the surviving spouse of the decedent; 
(e) other heirs of the decedent; 
(f) forty-five days after the death of the decedent, any 
creditor. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-201 (1997)(emphasis added). After Jamie Hupe's death, no will was 
presented for probate, no devisees named, and Jamie did not leave a spouse. Therefore, under 
sentence (e), "other heirs of the decedent," or intestate heirs, are given preference for 
appointment as personal representative. Mr. Hupe is sole intestate heir of Jamie Hupe's estate. 
Furthermore, final appointment as personal representative is not required to be considered 
a nominee personal representative. The court in In re Estate of Reimer. 229 Neb. 406, 427 
N.W.2d 293 (1988) allowed a person nominated in a will and given priority under state law to 
collect attorney fees incurred while seeking probate and defending a contested will, even though 
the nominee later renounced his priority and was not appointed as personal representative.. 
The Utah Probate Code reflects the need to reimburse persons who care for the estate 
prior to appointment of a official personal representative. The Code states that "powers of a 
personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are 
benefidal to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same eflfect as those occurring 
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thereafter." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-701 (1997). Referring to the language of the Uniform 
Probate Code §3-720, as codified in Maryland law, the Maryland courts wrote that the legislature 
must have intended "that a defense of a will by either a personal representative (who presumably 
has qualified) or by a person nominated as a personal representative (who presumably has not 
qualified) should similarly be at the expense of the estate." Webster v. Webster. 268 Md. 153, 
170, 299 A.2d 814, 823 (1973). The law encourages responsible estate management by 
compensating persons who serve the estate in the interim period prior to official appointment of a 
personal representative. 
In this case, after Jamie Hupe died, Mr. Hupe was the sole intestate heir to the estate. 
Under the Utah Probate Code, Mr. Hupe was preferred for appointment as personal 
representative and was therefore a nominee personal representative. Mr. Hupe fulfilled his 
fiduciary duties by seeking administration of the estate. Because the estate consisted of an 
annuity, a court order determining who inherited the estate was necessary prior to the payment 
out of funds. Although Mr. Hupe was never officially appointed as personal representative, he is 
a 'person nominated as personal representative' under Utah Probate Code Section 75-3-719 and 
is therefore entitled to compensation for the services he rendered on behalf of the estate. 
Second, by acting in good faith, Mr. Hupe is entitled to reimbursement for expenses he 
incurred on behalf of Jamie Hupe's estate. A nominee personal representative has an implied duty 
to administer the estate. Courts have held that, "[e]ven if the will is challenged before it is 
admitted to probate and a personal representative appointed, the personal representative named in 
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the will has the duty to defend in a will contest" In re Killen, 188 Ariz 569, 574, 937 P 2d 1375, 
1380 (1996). See also. Re Swanson's Estate. 240 Iowa 1011, 1016, 38 N W.2d 652, 655 (1949) 
(finding a nominee executor had a duty to propound a will for probate and to resist threatened 
contests, and attorney fees reasonably incurred would be allowable against the estate) and, Re 
Vaughn's Estate. 149 Wash. 291, 293, 270 P 1030, 1031 (1928)(awarding attorney fees to 
nominated executor who sought probate of an estate and defended the estate in will contest) 
Administering and defending an estate in a will contest are of benefit to the estate and 
good faith services. In allowing attorney fees, the court in Salmon v. Salmon. 9 Tex. Sup. J. 34, 
395 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1965), stated, "a person named as executor in a will is deemed to be acting 
for the benefit of the estate when he, in good faith and with probable cause, employs attorneys to 
defend the will or prosecute an action to probate the same." The court also found the "right to 
allowance of a reasonable attorney's fees out of the assets of the estate is not affected by his 
interest in the outcome of the litigation or by the feet that he acted contrary to the wishes of other 
beneficiaries." Id. at 33. Furthermore, courts have found the "estate as an entity is benefited 
when genuine controversies as to validity or construction of will are litigated and finally 
determined." Matter of Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1992) see also. Matter of 
Estate of Peterson. 561 N.W.2d 618 (N.D. 1997) (finding "benefit to estate" includes personal 
representative's good faith attempts to effectuate testamentary intent) and, Matter of Estate of 
Stenson. 243 Mont. 17, 792 P.2d 1119 (1990)(upholding trial courts award of attorney fees 
incurred when attorneys' services resulted in determination of rightful heir and benefit to estate). 
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By seeking to administer an estate and in defending an estate in a will contest to determine the 
testator's intent, a nominee personal representative acts in good faith in benefiting the estate. 
A representative can only be reimbursed for services performed on behalf of the estate. 
In Ashton v. Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah App. 1997), the court did not award costs incurred 
by an administrator "in her role as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs to the 
estate, not as personal representative for the estate." In Ashton, the administrator and beneficiary 
incurred costs when she appealed a trial courts finding of the testators' intent, forcing Mrs. 
Ashton to divide the estate between herself and her husband's children from a former marriage. 
Id. at 824. Mrs. Ashton was not entitled to compensation from the estate because her appeal was 
solely for personal benefit. 
However, a nominee personal representative is entitled to compensation for services 
rendered the estate, even though they may also be a benefidaiy of the estate. In Estate of Killea 
188 Ariz. 569, 576, 937 P.2d 1375, 1381 (1996), the court found the Uniform Probate Code 
"does not exclude a right to reimbursement from the estate if the personal representative is also a 
benefidaiy of the will," arguing a "personal representative who is also a devisee of the will should 
not have to fulfill his duty to defend the validity of the will under the risk that he will have to 
personally bear the expense of the defense merely because he is also a benefidaiy." Therefore, 
although courts do not reimburse for personal actions, a representative is entitled to 
reimbursement for serving the estate even though he would benefit from a successful defense. 
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As a nominee personal representative, Mr. Hupe had a duty to administer and defend the 
estate of Jamie Hupe. Mr. Hupe expedited the administration of the estate by filing for informal 
probate and appointment of a personal representative. Since no will was presented following 
Jamie Hupe's death, the law presumes all wills were revoked by the testator. Litigation costs 
were incurred in defending the estate while proponents of the lost holographic will sought to rebut 
this presumption. This litigation was necessary to determine the disposition of the estate. It was 
necessary for Mr. Hupe as nominee personal representative, to defend the estate at trial ultimately 
and benefiting the estate. At all times he was acting in good faith. Therefore, the estate should 
bear the costs. Although the lost holographic will was ultimately admitted and Mr. Hupe was not 
officially appointed as personal representative, Mr. Hupe acted in good faith throughout the 
proceedings and the administration of the estate to this point is the direct result of Mr. Hupe's 
services. Mr. Hupe should be reimbursed the reasonable expenses he incurred in seeking 
administration of Jamie Hupe's estate. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hupe is entitled to recover from the estate reasonable costs he incurred while 
serving the estate in good faith. In the absence of a will, Utah law gives the intestate heir 
preference in seeking appointment as personal representative. As sole intestate heir, Mr. Hupe is 
given this preference and is therefore a nominee personal representative in the law. Mr. Hupe 
sought to administer the estate and defended the estate in a will contest. In these actions, Mr. 
Hupe served the estate in good feith by fulfilling his duty as nominee personal representative and 
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benefiting the estate by seeking the testator's intent. Therefore, as nominee personal 
representative, Mr. Hupe is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees he incurred in 
good faith on behalf of the estate. 
DATED this 22^-day of June, 1998. 
ELIZABETH S. CONLEY 0 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the %zi day of June, 1998, I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the following-
Leslie Van Frank, Esq. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
<$L^J*CtL dfHjP^J 
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City. UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801)532-2666 
Facsimile: (801)355-1813 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HUPE, JAMffi PETER, 
(Deceased) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
HAROLD HUPE'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
CaseNo.973300019ES 
Jeffrey P. Hupe ("Jeff), by and through his undersigned counsel, files the following 
Memorandum in Opposition to Harold Hupe's ("Harold") Motion for Attorneys Fees. 
INTRODUCTION 
Harold's argument that he is entitled to attorneys fees rests on the erroneous premise mat he 
qualities under the statute at issue as a "person nonnnated as personal representative." The premise 
is unsupported by any law, and would lead to the unacceptable consequence that all will contests are 
to be funded solely by the decedent's estate. Harold's argument is soundly contradicted by the case 
law to which Harold has cited as well as the policy underpinning the entire Probate Code. Harold 
provided no benefit to Jamie's estate, and he is not entitled to attorneys fees under the statute. 
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1. HAROLD HUPE IS NOT A "PERSON NOMINATED AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE." 
The Utah Probate Code at §75-3-719 allows "any personal representative or person 
nominated as personal representative" to defend or prosecute any proceeding in good faith, 
successfully or not, and to receive from the estate "his necessary expenses and disbursements, 
including reasonable attorneys fees incurred." The key language in the statute is that one who seeks 
to recover thereunder must be either appointed by the Court as the personal representative or be 
"nominated as personal representative." Harold admits that he was never appointed, but argues that 
he acted as a "nominee personal representative" because he allegedly had priority under §75-3-203 
to be appointed as personal representative, and he claims he provided services on behalf of the estate. 
This fallaciousness of this argument can been seen by examining the invalidity of the various 
premises on which it is based: 
Harold Provided No Benefit to the Estate. As Harold admits, a personal representative can 
only be reimbursed for services performed on behalf of the estate. (Harold's Memorandum, p, 7). 
But Harold did not provide services to the estate — instead, in contravention of the expressed 
purposes of the Probate Code, Le., to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property, §75-l-102(2Xb), Harold sought to defeat Jamie's intent and to prevent 
Jamie's Will ftom being probated Despite having knowledge of the Will even prior to filinghis 
petition seeking intestacy, Harold wait ahead and asked the court for an order determining that Jamie 
died intestate. In essence, Harold pursued his own self-interest to ensure that Jamie's intent that Jeff 
receive the assets contained within the estate would never be effectuated 
2 
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Estate of Ambers, All N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1991) is instructive with regard to Harold's non-
entitlement to attorneys fees. In that case, the individual nominated as personal representative in the 
will filed a petition for appointment and for formal probate of the will. Several heirs objected to the 
petition, and filed a cross-petition for adjudication of intestacy, alleging that the execution of the will 
was procured by fraud. The jury ruled in favor of testacy, and the initial petition was granted, 
appointing the individual nominated in the will as personal representative of the estate. The personal 
representative was then allowed to recover costs and disbursements associated with the will contest 
directly from the unsuccessful will contestants. The contestants appealed, asserting that a statute 
identical to the one in the case at bar required the personal representative to recover the costs from 
the estate. In denying the contestants' appeal, the court ruled: 
Contestants' challenge of [the will] did not benefit the estate and was not intended to 
benefit the estate. The purpose of the challenge was limited to effecting a change in 
who received the estate. Furthermore, to rule as the Contestants urge would diminish 
the estate and the Nelsons, as the sole beneficiaries of the will, would have to bear 
the entire expense of upholding the will challenged by the Contestants. "It seems to 
us that the probate code should p*18] not be construed so as to permit one heir or 
devisee to finance his or her lawsuit against another heir or devisee out of the funds 
of the estate." Estate ofKjorvestaiL 375N.W.2dl60,171 (N.D. 1985), quoting Estate 
ofKesting, 220 Neb. 524, 371 NW.2d 107, 109 (1985). Nor should a devisee be 
forced to bear the expense of upholding a will challenged by an heir or another 
devisee in a proceeding that was not intended to benefit the estate. 
Estate of Ambers, All N.W.2d at 224. Under the same principles by which the personal 
representative in Ambers was allowed to collect costs and disbursements from the will contestants, 
the will contestants would be prevented from collecting their own costs and disbursements that they 
had incurred from the estate. Harold contested the Will - he did not attempt to uphold the Will. He 
is not entitled to fund his challenge to the Will out of the funds of the estate. 
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Harold Was Never Nominated as Personal Representative- None of the statuu 
to which Harold has cited support Harold's argument that the phrase "nominated as personal 
representative" in the attorneys fees statute makes reference to one who has priority for appom* 
Instead, in each and every case to which Harold has cited, the individual entitled to his/her -> -
fees was either (a) actually appointed by the court as personal representative, or (b) was act me a* 
personal representative pursuant to a nomination in the deceased's will. The statute thai allow* ^ 
to individuals nominated in a will is predicated in the notion that such individuals have a fiduciary 
duty to defend the document which appointed them: 
. . . [T]he personal representative of an estate has a duty to defend the validity of th* 
decedent's will if the will is challenged. The Arizona Supreme Court stair ' 
Monaghan's Estate, 60 Ariz, 346, 351-52, 137 P2d 390, 391-92 (1943. 
executor appointed by will . . . must in duty to his trust, protect the instrument when 
it is assailed in court." More recently, the supreme court affirmed this rule in In re 
Harber's Estate, 104 Ariz. 79, 89, 449P2d7,17(1969), when it adopted the rule i J< 
forth in In re Corotto, 125 Cal App 2d 314, 270 P.2d 498 (Cal App. 195 " *H* 
"after a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the executor to defend and 
uphold it against subsequent attack, and that this duty rests primarily upon i «• 
not the legatees and devisees." Even if the will is challenged before [* * * 14 j it is 
admitted to probate and a personal representative appointed, the personal 
representative named in the will has the duty to defend in a will contest. In re Pitt's 
Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 533, 541, 405 P2d 471, 479 (1965). Thus, as the personal 
representative named in the will, Marion clearly had a duty to defend Mrs. Killen's 
will in the will contest 
In re Killen, 188 Ariz. 569,937 P.2d 1375 (1996) (emphasis added) (cited in Harold's Memorandum 
at pp. 6 and 7). Thus, one who is nominated as a personal representative in a will and who \,, - . n< 
fiduciary obligations imposed by the document should be allowed "to in good faith pursue 
appropriate legal proceedings without unfairly compelling the representative to risk n^on,-.1 
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financial loss by underwriting the expenses of those proceedings." Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 
515 (N.D. 1992) (cited by Harold at p. 6 of his Memorandum). 
The Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-719, the attorneys fees statute on which Harold has 
relied, reflects this need to protect those who have fiduciary obligations imposed by nomination in 
a will: 
A personal representative is a fiduciary for successors of the estate (§75-3-
703). Though the will naming him may not yet be probated, the priority for 
appointment conferred by §75-3-203 on one named executor in a probated will 
means that that the person named has an interest, as a fiduciary, in seeking the 
probate of the will.... \T]he Code changes the idea followed in some jurisdictions 
that an executor lacks standing to contest other wills which, if valid, would supersede 
the will naming him, and standing to oppose other contests that may be mounted 
against the instrument nominating him. 
§75-3-719 Ed. Bd. Comment (emphasis added). 
It is apparent from this comment that the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code as well as the 
Utah Legislature intended by this statute only to protect the fiduciary responsibilities of persons 
actually named as personal representative or persons named as a personal representative in a will. 
In the absence of those fiduciary responsibilities, the statute has no application. There is no question 
that Harold was not nominated in Jamie's Will as the personal representative. Thus, Harold had no 
fiduciary obligation to effectuate Jamie's intent as expressed in that Will. 
Priority for Appointment Does Not Create Status as "A Person Nominated As Personal 
Representative." Harold claims status as "a person nominated as personal representative" only 
because he had priority for appointment Harold has cited to nothing in support of that claim. But 
by definition, the fiduciary obligations of one who has been nominated as personal representative 
do not attach simply as a result of having priority under the statute. A "fiduciary" is defined as "a 
5 
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person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters 
connected with such undertaking." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979). One who acts in a 
"fiduciary capacity" does not act for "his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person." Id. 
And a "nominee" . . . 
. . . ordinarily indicates one designated to act for another as his representative in a 
rather limited sense. It is used sometimes to signify an agent or trustee. It has no 
connotation, however, other than that of acting for another, in representation of 
another, or as the grantee of another. 
Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 584; 141 P.2d 433,438 (1943) (emphasis added), quoting 
Schuh Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95 R 2d 404, 411, (7th Cir. 1938). 
Fiduciary duties do not attach simply as a result of having priority under the statute. For 
example, a surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee has priority for appointment over other 
devisees or heirs. §75-3-201(b). But this same surviving devisee spouse who is not nominated by 
the will as personal representative has no fiduciary obligation to submit the will for probate. Instead, 
the surviving spouse may exercise his/her right to take an elective share of the estate pursuant to §75-
2-201 and allow the other devisees to take steps to probate the will. See, e.g., In re Little, 22 Utah 
204,61 P. 899 (1900) (renunciation by widow of her rights under deceased spouse's will does not 
nullify other devisees' right to take un&er will). 
Harold was not a nominee for anyone and had no fiduciary duty to anyone. In accordance 
with his own argument, as the sole intestate heir, he had the ability to be directly appointed. His 
petition reflects that that is exactly what he did - apply directiy for appointment. Thus, he is not "a 
6 
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person nominated as personal representative" — and he is not entitled to his attorneys fees under the 
statute. 
Harold Acted Only In His Own Personal Self-Interest. Regardless, Harold still asserts 
(without authority) that he did, in fact, have a fiduciary obligation — one which he owed to the estate. 
(Harold's Memorandum, p. 5). Harold does not assert that he undertook to safekeep property of the 
estate or to pursue claims on behalf of the estate for recovery of property. What he asserts is that he 
fulfilled his fiduciary obligation by seeking a court order "determining who inherited the estate/" ' 
(Harold's Memorandum, p. 5). In other words, he filed the initial petition seeking an order of 
intestacy — as well as a determination that he was the sole heir. The petition was a form document -
his attorney could have prepared it in less than an hour. All of the rest of Harold's involvement in 
this case was spent in attempting to defeat Jamie's intent and to prevent Jamie's Will from being 
probated. These efforts were taken in direct contravention of the purposes and policies underlying 
the Probate Code, which are, in part, <cto discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property" and to do so in an efficient and speedy manner. §75-l-102(2)(b) and 
(c). The fact that Harold beat Jeflf to the courthouse steps and filed his petition first does not 
transmute his subsequent selfish efforts into some pretentious fiduciary responsibility to theestate. 
If that were so, then anyone could file a petition in intestacy and challenge a will, all at no risk. The 
"good faith" required by the attorneys fees statute is a veiy low standard — any challenge, no matter 
1
 Harold asserts that the presumption of intestacy that accompanied the loss of Jamie's 
Will somehow affects his responsibilities to the estate. In fact, the presumption of intestacy 
applies in all probate proceedings — until a will is probated, the decedent is presumed to have 
died intestate. Linger v. Upshaw Co., 144 S.E.2d 689,696 (W.Va. 1965). The presumption 
becomes final after three years in the absence of a probated will. U.C.A. §75-3-107(3). 
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how attenuated, that met at least Rule 11 requirements, would require all will contests to be made 
solely at the expense of the estate. 
The law does not support Harold's argument. In none of the cases that Harold has cited was 
the will contestant, successful or not, awarded attorneys fees. Instead, each and every case to which 
Harold has cited indicates that the estate will pay for the fees of one who has a fiduciary obligation 
to pursue litigation on behalf of the estate — an obligation that arises out of a formal appointment as 
personal representative or as one who has been nominated by a will to be personal representative. 
See, Webster v. Webster, 268 Md 153,299 A.2d 814 (1973) (cited at p. 5 of Harold's Memorandum) 
(personal representative nominated in will and appointed by court allowed attorneys fees incurred 
in defending will); In re Killen, 188 Ariz, 569, 937 P.2d 1375 (1996) (cited at pp. 6 and 7 of 
Haiold's Memorandum) (same); Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1992) (cited at p. 6 of 
Harold's Memorandum) (same); Matter of Estate of Peterson, 561 N.W.2d 618 (N.D. 1997), (cited 
at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same); In re Estate ofReimer, 229 Neb. 406,427 N.W.2d 293 
(1988) (cited at p. 4 of Harold's Memorandum) (individual who was allowed to collect attorneys fees 
for will contest had been nominated in the will as personal representative and defended the contested 
will); Estate ofVaughan, 270 P.1030 (Wash 1928) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same); 
Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W2d 29,33 (Tex. 1965) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same); 
In re Swanson, 240 Iowa 1011, 38 N.W. 2d 652 (1949) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) 
(individuals nominated in will as executors entitled to attorneys fees incurred in defending will); In 
re Stenson, 792 P.2d 1119 (Mont. 1990) (personal representative appointed by court entitled to 
attorneys fees in pursuing heirship proceedings); In re Ashton, 898 P.2d 824 (Utah App. 1995) 
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(personal representative appointed by court not awarded attorneys fees incurred in pursuing own 
personal interests in having property pass to her outside of the estate). 
In none of the cases cited was the will contestant awarded attorneys fees for the challenge. 
Absent the fiduciary obligations that accompany formal court appointment as a personal 
representative or the nomination in a will, an intestate heir who challenges a will is acting in one's 
own personal self-interest. In the instant case, Harold fought tooth and nail to prevent Jamie's intent 
from being effectuated. Harold's efforts were in direct contravention of the best interests of the 
estate — nothing that Harold did was calculated to ensure that Jamie's intent was carried ou 
Everything that Harold did was done in his own self-interest that Jamie's intent not be effectuated, 
but that the estate be determined to pass intestate to Harold. 
Harold Did Not Have Priority for Appointment as Personal Representative. Pursuant 
to §75-3-203, it was Jeff, and not Harold, who had priority to be appointed as personal 
representative. That statute states that "persons who are not disqualified have priority for 
appointment in the following order: (a) the person with priority as determined by a probated will, 
including a person nominated by a power conferred in a will; . - . (e) other heirs of the decedent" 
Unquestionably, since Jamie's Will not only nominated Jeff as the personal representative, but the 
Will was also probated, Jeff had and has priority for appointment 
Harold Does Not Fall Within the Class of Individuals To Whom the Statute Allowing 
Attorneys Fees is Directed. As set forth above, Harold was not "a person nominated as personal 
representative" and is not entitled to his fees pursuant to §75-3-719. 
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2. HAROLD WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO 
RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Harold has waived his claim to attorneys fees in this will contest by not pleading n . 
raising it until after the close of evidence. While no technical forms of pleadings >> 
required under Rule 8(e), U.R.Civ.P., Utah is a notice pleading state. To present 
attorneys fees, Harold had to have at least made passing reference to the claim in his opening petition 
or at least in response to Jeffs cross-petition. See, Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105,111 o n ltr^ 
1982) (prayer for attorneys fees set out in counterclaim is sufficient to preserve clr. 
failed to assert any claim for fees, Harold is now prevented from raising the issue. 
Harold has further waived his claim for attorneys fees by failing to present any evidence at 
trial concerning them. Failure to present evidence on a claim at issue is generally viewed as a wai \ ei 
of the claim. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382,1391 (Utah 1982). Harold made 
no reference to attorneys fees until his post-trial motion, and has yet to present any evidence thereon. 
Even to the extent that Harold could be considered to be a "person nominated as personal 
representative" (which he is not), Harold has waived any right to assert his claim for fees in this 
proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Harold's Motion for Attorneys Fees should be denied. 
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DATED this (3 day of July, 1998 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was hand-delivered on this \* day of July, 1998, to the following: 
Kent B. Alderman, Esq. 
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe 
F:\LESLIBJULY98WJPEATTYi4EM 
11 
A-24 
ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JAMIE HUPE 
Deceased. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. 973300019 ES 
* * * * * * * 
Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe"), by and through his counsel, submits the following REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public policy as reflected in the uniform probate code supports Mr. Hupe claim for 
attorneys fees in bis petition for appointment as personal representative of the estate of Jamie 
Hupe and defense against Jeff Hupe's ("Jeff") cross petition. 
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The uniform probate code sets out rules governing how the property of one generation 
shall be transferred to another. A will may be presented for probate or in the absence of a will 
then intestate provisions govern the transfer of the estate. 
In this case no will or copy of a will was ever produced. More than six months after 
decedent's death, Mr. Hupe filed for probate. Jeff Hupe, the proponent of a will claimed that 
there was a lost holographic will naming him as personal representative and sole heir. However, 
Jeff did not file for probate of the lost will until after Mr. Hupe's petition was filed. There was 
insufficient evidence to establish that a lost will had been made, property executed and not 
revoked. As the sole intestate heir of the estate Mr. Hupe was the logical person to seek to 
administer the estate. In that context Mr. Hupe filed his petition. In order to bring the estate to a 
conclusion, it was appropriate for Mr. Hupe, the sole intestate heir, to file his petition and to 
insure that the estate passed as it was intended. Mr. Hupe's defense against Jeffs cross petition 
effected that purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
L MIL HUPE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE ESTATE OF 
JAMIE HUPE BECAUSE HE SERVED THE ESTATE IN MAKING THE 
PROPONENT OF A LOST WILL ESTABLISH THE FACT THAT A WILL HAD 
BEEN PROPERLY EXECUTED AND NOT REVOKED. 
Jeff argues that Mr. Hupe is not a "person nominated as personal representative." He 
argues that in order to be a "person nominated as personal representative" one must provide 
benefit to the estate (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 2), be nominated as personal representative (Jeffs 
Memorandum, p. 4), and not act out of self-interest (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 7). However, Jeffs 
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argument fails to acknowledge that at the time Mr. Hupe acted on behalf of the estate, the will 
Jeff relies upon was under considerable question since it is a holographic will and the testator's 
intent was yet to be established through witness testimony. 
A. Because No Will or Copy of the Will Was Ever Produced. No Attorney or Witness 
to the Execution of the Will Came Forward. It was Necessary to Demand that Jeff 
Present Sufficient Evidence of a Lost Will. 
When Mr. Hupe sought to probate the estate of Jamie Hupe there was no will recognized 
by law. This fact is essential to the question of attorney fees because had the will been available 
and legally recognized, there would have been no question as to whose role it was to care for the 
estate. Jeff objected to Mr. Hupe's efforts to informally probate the estate, arguing that a lost will 
was prepared. Two fiiends of Jeffs testified that they saw a will in decedent's handwriting but 
did not remember who the witnesses were or who notarized the will Certainly, anyone would 
question the validity of a lost holographic will in such attenuated circumstances. When Mr. Hupe 
acted on behalf of Jamie Hupe's estate, the lost will was not legally recognized and, therefore, Mr. 
Hupe acted reasonably in not relying on what Jeffs friends said was in the will. 
B. Mr. Hupe Stood As ft« Nnpiinf** Pftrpnnnl Representative with Fiduciary 
Responsibilities in Representing the Estate. 
The law does not define a "person nominate as personal representative." In the absence of 
a dear definition, Mr. Hupe relied upon his fiduciary obligation as the sole intestate heir in seeking 
to probate the estate. Jeff uses Black's Law Dictionaiy to argue that Mr. Hupe had no fiduciaiy 
obligation. (Jeff's Memorandum, p. 6). However, he refuses to recognize that at the time of Mr. 
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Hupe's actions, Mr. Hupe was the sole heir to the estate and was preferred over all others 
interested in becoming the personal representative. See. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203 (1997) 
(giving priority to heirs of the estate in absence of a probated will or surviving spouse). Even the 
Editorial Board Comment Jeff refers to in his Opposition states that a personal representative has 
a fiduciary duty to seek probate. §75-3-719 Ed. Bd. Comment (cited in Jeffs Memorandum, p. 
5). 
C. Until The Lost Will Was Admitted to Probate. The Estate Could Not Be 
Concluded. 
Jeff makes every effort to convince this court that Mr. Hupe did not benefit the estate. 
However, this determination must be made by considering the facts at the time the services were 
rendered. Mr. Hupe took the most efficient and cost effective means of probating the estate and 
seeking resolution of questions regarding the validity of the lost will. Jeff merely wishes he had 
not been forced to meet his legal obligation of proving the validity of the lost will. By seeking 
probate, and defending the estate in consideration of a lost will, Mr. Hupe insured that the 
testator's intent is followed. 
Jeff refers to Estate of Ambers. 477 N.W.2d 218 (NJD. 1991) as instructing in the issue of 
attorney fees for a personal representative. (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 3). However, the facts are 
dissimilar. In Ambers the challengers to the estate claimed that a 1955 will should control over a 
1989 will, claiming undue influence. The court points out that the challengers used a contingency 
fee arrangement with the devisees of the 1955 will, seemingly indicating that the challengers had 
no real interest in justly determining the testator's intent. Mr. Hupe is not similar to the 
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challengers in Ambers. In fact, Mr. Hupe resembles the individual nominated as personal 
representative whom the court awarded attorney fees against the challengers. 
Jeff argues that Mr. Hupe was never nominated as personal representative and therefore 
the cases we cite were not effective because they all deal with persons appointed or nominated in 
wills. (Jeff's Memorandum, p. 4). Jeff emphasized the Arizona Supreme Court's statement that 
"[e]ven if the will is challenged before it is admitted to probate and a personal representative 
appointed, the personal representative named in the will has the duty to defend in a will contest." 
In re Kfllen. 188 Ariz. 569, 937 P.2d 1375 (1996). However, had Mr. Hupe prevailed at trial, 
then the cases cited in his memorandum would apply equally to Jeff Hupe. The only difference in 
application of the case law is the issue of who was proposing a wilL It is not logical to say that a 
proponent of a will who does not prevail may, nevertheless, be awarded attorneys fees but not an 
opponent of a will. This argument particularly lades credibility in light of the fact that no will or 
copy of a will was ever presented to the court. 
Mr. Hupe's actions ultimately benefited the estate. The purpose and policy of the Probate 
Code is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of Ins property" 
and to do so in an efficient and speedy manner. UtahCode Ann. §75-l-102(2)(b) and(c). Again, 
in looking at the facts at the time of Mr. Hupe's services, Mr. Hupe used all possible means to 
determine the intent of Jamie Hupe in an efficient and speedy manner. After filing for informal 
probate, Mr. Hupe moved for summaiy judgment in order to efficiently determine the validity of 
the lost will 
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H. A MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS NOT WAIVED SO LONG AS IT IS 
MADE PRIOR TO THE SIGNED ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
In a recent Utah case the Supreme Court set out a bright line test for the time when a 
motion for attorneys fees must be made. In Meadowbroole LLC v. Flower 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27 (Utah, 1998), the court states that the time in which a motion for attorneys fees must be filed 
is the signed entry of final judgment. The court noted three policy reason for its decision. First, 
requiring parties to present evidence of attorneys fees at trial would contravene judicial economy. 
Second, determination of reasonable attorneys fees is an issue generally left to the discretion of 
the court. Third, there must be a time of finality when a claim for attorney fees must be raised or 
waived. "That time is the signed entry of final judgment." Id At 29, citing Fair Housing 
Advocates Ass'n v. James. 682 N.E.2d 1045,1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
In this case Mr. Hupe was acting as the nominee personal representative in his status as 
sole intestate heir of the estate. Before a distribution of the estate could occur, a court order 
identifying the heir of the estate had to be entered. As the sole heir in an intestate succession, Mr. 
Hupe was qualified to be nominated as personal representative and absent Jefif Hupe's contest 
would have been so appointed. Mr. Hupe filed his petition not, in a rush to the courthouse steps, 
but more than six months after decedent's death. In a situation that could not be resolved by 
summary judgment, it was reasonable for Mr. Hupe to insist that the feet of a lost will be firmly 
established. He did so and the estate was benefited. 
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DATED this %\ day of July, 1998. 
ELIZABSIH S. CONLEY Q 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the flz day of Jvfat 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the following: 
Leslie Van Frank, Esq. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
$t^*X*b***tf 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT0111^ ^ 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: : MINUTE ENTRY 
HUPE, JAMIE PETER : CASE NO. 973300019 
(Deceased) 
For the reasons set forth below, Harold Hupe's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees is denied* 
Mr* Hupe seeks an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the 
Utah Probate Code (^ Code") section which states, *If any personal 
representative or person nominated as a personal representative 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether 
successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his 
necessary expenses and disbursements/ including reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred." Utah Code Ann., Section 75-3-719 (1997) . 
Mr. Hupe was neither the personal representative of the Estate of 
Jamie Hupe, nor a person nominated as a personal representative and 
is not, therefore/ eligible to recover fees tinder this section. 
Contrary to the assertions made in Mr. Hupef s Memoranda in Support 
of his Motion for Attorney's Fees, he never held the status as a 
^nominee" to be the personal representative of Jamie Hupe'6 Estate. 
A nominee, to be a personal representative, is a person whose 
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candidacy for appointment is the result of an act of *an individual 
and not by operation of law. This distinction is reinforced in 
Utah Code Ann., Section 75-3-203/ which establishes priority among 
those seeking appointment as personal representative. This section 
consistently uses the term ""nominate" or one of its allied forms, 
in the context of describing the acts of individuals, be they 
decedents speaking through a will, minors, or conservators. A 
nominee refers, in almost every context, legal or otherwise, to a 
specific person designated by name. As used in the Code, a nominee 
can be distinguished from a class of persons defined by the nature 
of their relationship to a decedent who are rendered eligible for 
designation as a personal representative by operation of law. 
The distinction between nominees and candidates for personal 
representative who acquire their status by operation of law can be 
harmonized easily by the statutory objectives of Utah Code Ann*# 
Section 75-3-719• A bona fide nominee, having been expressly 
singled out by a decedent to serve as personal representative/ is 
likely to feel duty-bound to resist challenges to the decedent's 
express desires.1 When made in good faith, a nominee's defense of 
Estate of ambers, 477 N.w.2d 218 (N,D. 1991), does not alter 
this observation. In that case, the alleged nominee's claim to 
status as personal representative, together with his assertion of 
entitlement to attorney's fees based on that claim were rejected 
because the decedent's will and the personal representative's 
nomination were fraudulently procured. 
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his claim to be appointed personal representative is, therefore, 
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann,, Section 75-3-719. 
Moreover, I am persuaded of the merits of the argument made by 
Jeffrey Hupe that while a fiduciary duty inevitably attaches to a 
nominee, the same cannot be said for a candidate as personal 
representative who has acquired his status by operation of law. 
Jeff Hupe's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this_J?2«<A 
day of October, 1998: 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorney for Petitioner Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
• Kent B. Alderman 
Elizabeth S. Coftley 
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe 
201 S. Main, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
<Wifl.dWl*. 
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HUPE, JAMIE PETER, 
(Deceased) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Case No. 973300019ES 
The motion of Harold Hupe for attorneys fees having come before the Court, the Court 
having reviewed the parties' memoranda and having previously entered its minute entry denying 
the same, and for good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Harold Hupe's Motion for Attorneys Fees is denied. 
DATED this day of October, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ronald E. Nehring 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, P.C. 
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq. 
Attorneys for Harold Hupe 
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CERTTFTCATE OF DELTVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
c t 
was hand-delivered on tfus^l " day of October, 1998, to the following: 
Kent B. Alderman, Esq. 
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe 
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
In the Matter of the Estate of I MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
DENIAL OF 
JAMIE HUPE ATTORNEY FEES 
Deceased. Case No. 973300019 ES 
* * * * * * * 
Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe"), by and through his counsel, submits die following MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Hupe requests this Court reconsider its denial of attorney fees and grant him attorney 
fees for the following reasons. First, the Utah Uniform Probate Code requires award of attorney 
fees to personal representatives for probate proceedings prosecuted or defended in good faith, 
regardless of their outcome. Second, Mr. Hupe is entitled to attorney fees because his actions to 
probate the estate benefited the estate as a whole. Third, equity demands that the estate bear the 
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cost of the decedent's own failure to make sure that his testamentary intent was properly 
documented. Fourth, denial of attorney fees in this situation discourages interested persons from 
involving themselves in probate proceedings and threatens the Uniform Probate Code's policy 
objective of ensuring that the testamentary intent of decedents is promptly and accurately 
determined through probate proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ENTITLES PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVES TO BE REIMBURSED FOR THE EXPENSES OF GOOD 
FAITH PROBATE PROCEEDINGS, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF 
•raOSEmOCEEDTNGS. 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code states: "If any personal representative or person 
nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, 
whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and 
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.'' Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 
(1997). This statutory language clearly contemplates that there will be meaningful provision for 
award of attorneys fees on a case-by-case basis, and not that attorney fees will be awarded by law 
to whichever party ultimately prevails in the probate proceeding. Nonetheless, Jeff Hupe has 
argued, and the court has apparently accepted, that attorneys fees should not be awarded to a 
person with priority for appointment under the statute who comes forward to probate the will but 
is not ultimately appointed as the personal representative. This result is both inequitable and 
contrary to the clear policy objects of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
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Mr. Hupe came forward six months after the decedent's death to probate the estate. At 
the time Mr. Hupe applied for appointment as personal representative, Jeff Hupe had not 
produced the holographic will or initiated any probate proceeding, and was not an interested 
person with standing to participate in the probate proceedings. Thus Mr. Hupe was the only 
person with standing to act as personal representative and prosecute probate proceedings on 
behalf of the estate. To argue, in hindsight, that the estate should not reimburse Mr. Hupe's 
attorneys fees because the court ultimately admitted a later-discovered will into probate that 
named Jeff Hupe, instead of Mr. Hupe, as the personal representative, creates the dangerous 
precedent that applicants for personal representative whose applications are successfully 
challenged may not seek reimbursement for legal expenditures made in good faith to probate the 
estate in the face of questionable alleged wills. Such a rule would force personal representatives 
in intestacy to chose between withdrawing fiom the proceedings and allowing the proponents of 
alleged testamentary instruments to go forward uncontested, or proceeding with probate in the 
knowledge that if the challenge to probate is successful, he will be forced to bear all of die costs 
of probate. 
H. MR. HUPE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE HIS ACTIONS TO 
PROBATE THE ESTATE WERE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ESTATE AS A 
WHOLE, 
Mr. Hupe is also entitled to attorney fees in this case because his actions in probating the 
intestate estate benefited the estate as a whole. JeffHiqpe cites numerous cases denying attorney 
fees to unsuccessfiil individual claimants in contested probate proceedings. However, these 
23774S.1 3 
A-41 
cases are dissimilar from the Hupe case because they involved disputes solely over the 
distribution of estate assets under uncontested testamentary instruments. In contrast, the issue in 
this case was the validity of a lost holographic will last seen in the hands of the decedent. 
Numerous states have held that "[t]he services of counsel in preventing distribution under invalid 
testamentary instruments must be held to confer a benefit upon the estate." The New Mexico 
Appeals Court dealt with this issue in In Re Estate of Foster. 102 KM. 707, 713, 699 P.2d 638, 
644 (N.M. Ct App. 1985). In that case, the New Mexico Appeals Court held that litigation to 
contest an alleged will benefited the decedent's estate as a whole because such litigation 
"protected the assets of the estate from being distributed pursuant to an invalid will." IdL, 699 
P.2d at 644. Similarly, In Re Estate of Kaschor. 637 P.2d 855 (Okl. 1981) litigation to prevent 
the probate of an invalid will is a benefit to the entire estate. See In Re Limberg's Estate, 257 
App. Div. 827,11 N.Y. S. 2d 908,909 (1939). 
Jeff Hupe appears to argue that Mr. Hupe's actions were for his own benefit, rather than 
for the benefit of the estate, merely because Mr. Hupe would have been the decedent's heir in 
intestacy. However, this argument applies equally to Jeff Hupe, who was the sole heir under the 
lost holographic will. The Uniform Probate Code gives priority as personal representative to the 
heirs or devisees of decedents, and it is thus inevitable that participants in probate proceedings 
will act both in the estate's interest and in their own interest Jeff Hupe's suggestion that Mr. 
Hupef s status as an heir in intestacy should bar him from recovering fees creates a dangerous 
precedent and runs counter to the basic structure of the Uniform Probate Code, which mandates 
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that the participants in probate proceedings must be limited to those persons with a financial 
interest in the proceedings. Furthermore, it contradicts established case law in Utah and other 
jurisdictions mandating award of attorney fees to persons whose actions benefit the estate in 
probate. 
HI. EQUITY DEMANDS THAT THE ESTATE RATHER THAN MR. HUPE BEAR 
THE COST OF THE DECEDENT'S OWN FAILURE TO MAKE SURE THAT HIS 
TESTAMENTARY INTENT WAS PROPERLY DOCUMENTED. 
Equity also demands that Mr. Hupe be reimbursed for fees incurred to probate the estate 
in this case. A fundamental tenet of probate law is that the estate should bear the necessary costs 
of its own administration. The cost of contesting the alleged lost holographic will is a cost 
created by the estate in this case, and not a cost created by Mr. Hupe. Mr. Hupe was not 
responsible for causing this proceeding. The ultimate responsibility for this proceeding rests 
with the decedent, who either failed to produce a will or lost or destroyed the alleged holographic 
will 
Jeff Hupe argues that because Mr. Hupe's petition for appointment as personal 
representative was ultimately defeated in the course of the probate proceedings, Mr. Hupe had no 
fiduciary duty to probate the estate and is not entitled to reimbursement for any of the necessary 
probate expenses. However, the result of this position is that, because of Jeff Hupe's ultimately 
successful challenge, the estate itself is relieved of any responsibility for its own probate costs. 
This result is both inequitable and contrary to the principle that th estate should pay its own 
necessary costs of administration in probate. 
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IV. DENIAL OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS SITUATION CREATES A 
DISINCENTIVE FOR HEIRS TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN PROBATE 
PROCEEDINGS, AND THREATENS THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE'S 
POLICY OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT THE TESTAMENTARY INTENT 
OF DECEDENTS IS PROMPTLY AND ACCURATELY DETERMINED 
THROUGH PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. 
Finally, denial of attorney fees in this case contradicts the purposes of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code. The purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate code is to "to discover and make 
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." Utah Code Ann. § 75-l-102(b) 
(1996). A key means to accomplish this purpose is the involvement of interested persons as 
personal representatives to administer the estate and pursue probate proceedings. By denying 
Mr. Hupe's attorney fees, this court has established the precedent that the party who prevails in 
any contested probate proceeding will automatically be awarded attorney fees. This precedent 
contradicts that clear language of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, which entitled personal 
representatives to reimbursement of all necessary expenses incurred, whether in successful or 
unsuccessful actions. More fundamentally, however, this ruling means that interested persons 
who seek appointment as personal representative must bear the risk that if their appointment is 
successfully contested, the estate will have no obligation to pay any of their attorney fees. 
Imposing this level of risk on individuals seeking appointment as personal representative creates 
a strong disincentive for interested persons to come forward in any probate proceedings that they 
suspect might be contested. Such a result seriously undercuts the stated purpose of the Uniform 
Probate Code by creating a situation in which parties undertaking probate of intestate wills could 
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do so only at the risk of incurring unreimbursed legal fees in the event a later-discovered will 
was ultimately accepted into probate. 
CONCLUSION 
Denial of attorneys fees to Mr. Hupe is contrary to the plain language and policy 
objectives of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Furthermore, it creates an inequitable result 
insofar as it requires Mr. Hupe to pay necessary costs of administering the estate in probate. Jeff 
Hupe's characterization of Mr. Hupe's actions as self-serving is based solely on the court's 
subsequent determination to admit the lost will into probate, and this characterization does not 
reflect the reality of the case at the time these actions were taken. This is not a case, like those 
Jeff Hupe has cited, in which the only dispute is over division of property under an uncontested 
testamentary instrument Rather, Mr. Hupe's actions in contesting the lost holographic will were 
a good faith effort to ensure that the estate was distributed in accordance with the testamentary 
intent of the decedent For the above reasons, Mr. Hupe respectfiiUy requests this court 
reconsider its order denying attorney fees. 
DATED this ^ #H&ay of October, 1998. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of October, 1998, I caused to be hand 
delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTrON TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF 
ATTORNEY FEES to the following: 
Leslie Van Frank, Esq. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
fykjjufa, (M^y 
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile: (801)355-1813 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HUPE, JAMIE PETER, 
(Deceased) 
g ^ ^ = ^ ^ = ^ = 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
HAROLD HUPE'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER DENIAL OF 
ATTORNEYSFEES 
- ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED -
CaseNo.973300019ES 
Hoa Ronald R Nehring 
Jeffrey P. Hupe ("Jeff")* ty «nd through his undersigned counsel, files the following 
Memorandum in Opposition to Harold Hupe's ("Harold") Motion to Reconsider Denial of Attorneys 
Fees. 
A. HAROLD'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE 
IT IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPTED 
SECOND "BITE AT THE APPLE" 
While motions to reconsider are allowed under Rule 54(b) when a final judgment has not yet 
been entered, a litigant who hopes to change the court's mind should be prepared to demonstrate uiat 
at least one of the following factors is present: 
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(1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there 
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest 
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to 
correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by 
the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1311, (Utah CtApp. 1994), quoting State v. O'Neill, 
848 P.2d 694,697, fit 2 (Utah CtApp.) cert den., 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Harold has not only 
failed to cite to this controlling law, he has also completely failed to demonstrate that any of the 
Trembly factors is present 
The arguments that Harold has raised in his Motion to Reconsider either could have been 
raised in the original Motion for Attorneys Fees, or were fully briefed that original motion and have 
already been rejected by this Court As such, Harold has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 
54(b) for reconsideration of his original motion. 
B. HAROLD'S ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO HIS FEES 
BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT 
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE UNDER THE PROBATE CODE 
HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BY THIS COURT 
Harold asserts in his both his first and fourth points set forth in his Motion to Reconsider that 
as the applicant for status as personal representative ofthe estate, he is e 
The Court has already considered and rejected this argument As the Court has recognized and ruled, 
the statute on which Harold has predicated his request for attorneys fees allows "personal 
representatives" and "persons nominated as pei^nal representative" their re 
incurred, U.CA. §75-3-719 (1997)- Harold is neither - he was not appointed as personal 
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representative, nor Jamie ever nominate him as personal representative. Thus, Harold is not eligible 
under the statute for an award of fees.1 
Harold has not challenged the Court's careful statutory analysis of this point, but rather 
argues that the Court's ruling creates a disincentive for interested persons to seek intestacy probate, 
because they may be forced in the face of a proffered will to choose from withdrawing from the 
proceedings or risk bearing their own attorneys fees in an unsuccessful challenge to a will. (See 
Harold's Motion at pps. 3 and 6). On its face, this may be an argument for lobbying the legislature 
to change the statute. But it is not a basis on which Harold can urge this Court to ignore the statutory 
language of §75-3-719 and reverse its prior ruling against Harold 
Moreover, an analysis of Harold's argument reveals that Harold does not take into 
consideration the opposite effects of his risk analysis. By allowing attorneys fees to be paid out of 
the estate to unsuccessful will challengers, the law would encourage those who stand to benefit from 
the rejection of a will to raise even the most attenuated challenges to its probate. Thus, both sides 
of all will contests would funded solely at the expense of the estate. As Jeff explained in his prior 
opposition to Harold's original motion, the law does not support Harold's position. (See pps. 7-9 
of Jeff's Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees). Harold has yet to 
cite to a case in which an unsuccessful will contestant who was not a court-appointed personal 
representative or nominated as the personal representative in the will has been awarded his attorneys 
1
 In his reconsideration motion, Harold repeats his assertion that he was the only person 
with standing to act as personal representative and prosecute probate proceedings on behalf of the 
estate. (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 3). This is incorrect As Jeff pointed out in his 
opposition to Harold's original motion, as the person nominated in Jamie's Will as personal 
representative, Jeff had not only standing, but priority over Harold for appointment as personal 
representative. (Jeff's Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 9) 
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fees. None of the cases that Harold cited in his original motion awarded attorneys fees to such an 
individual (See p. 8 of Jeffs Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees). 
Nor do any of the three new cases that Harold has cited. Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 
638 (1985) awarded attorneys fees to will contestants, several of whom had been appointed by the 
court as special co-administrators, who were successful in preventing the will from being probated. 
In re Limberg's Estate, 257 App.Div. 827, 11 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1939) also involved the award of 
attorneys fees to the successful challengers. And as for Estate ofKaschor, 637 P.2d 855 (Okl. 1981), 
the court denied attorneys fees to the will challengers, even though they were successftd. 
Finally, Harold's argument that the Court's ruling creates a disincentive for interested persons 
in general to challenge wills is wholly disingenuous in the context of this litigation. Harold himself 
had tremendous incentive to challenge Jamie's Will — if Harold had succeeded in his efforts to 
challenge Jamie's Will, Harold would not only have been entitled tohave the estate reimburse him 
his fees, but Harold would have inherited Jamie's entire estate. The risk that Harold undertook in 
this case is no different than that which many civil litigants undertake — if you win, you might be 
awarded your attorney's fees, but if you lose, then the court will not award your fees, 
C HAROLD'S ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO HIS FEES 
BECAUSE HE BENEFITED THE ESTATE HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED. 
Although the benefit that Harold provided to the estate was challenged in the original motion 
that Harold filed and ultimately rej ected by this Court, Harold cites to three new cases in his Motion 
to Reconsider in support of his proposition that one who benefits the estate is entitled to an award 
of his fees. As set forth above, none of these three new cases involved the award of attorneys fees 
to individuals who unsuccessfully challenged a will One of the cases denied attorneys fees to 
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successful will challengers. Estate ofKaschor, supra. The other two cases indicate that a court may 
award attorneys fees under its equitable powers, but to will contestants who are successful in their 
efforts to prevent an invalid will from being probated. In re Limberg's Estate, supra; Estate of 
Foster, supra. 
An analysis of Foster and Limberg reveals that these courts were willing to award attorneys 
fees to the successful will contestant because it would be unfair to require one will contestant to bear 
the burden of all the attorneys fees at the expense of the other intestate heirs who benefitted from the 
will contestant's efforts. As the court in Limberg stated: 
If an allowance out of the general assets were denied, an anomalous situation would 
ensue. A contestant would then have to bear the expense for the attorneys' fees out 
of his own share despite the fact that his efforts resulted in equal benefit to all 
remaining distributees, who would thereupon profit by their inaction. 
In re Limberg's Estate, 11 N. Y.S.2d at 908. The Foster court quoted Limberg, explaining that all 
of tiie intestate heirs had benefited from the services of the challenging attorneys. Estate of Foster, 
699P.2dat646. 
Charging the estate with the attorneys fees in the circumstances described in Foster and 
Umberg is perhaps reasonable under the circumstances set forth in those cases, in that one intestate 
heir who successfully challenges a will does not suffer at the expense of the others that he has 
benefitted Butit does not follow afortori that the services of counsel thai attempted iwsiiccessfidly 
to prevent distribution under a valid will, as are the circumstances in the case at bar, are of similar 
benefit Indeed, the court in Estate ofKaschor, supra, denied the award of attorneys fees to even 
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successful will contestants, noting that "benefit" under the Oklahoma cases means an increase in the 
assets of the estate. Estate ofKaschor, 637 P.2d at 857. 
Harold did nothing in this case to increase the assets of the estate. Nor did Harold's actions 
benefit any other heirs. If anything, Harold's actions harmed Jeff, the sole heir to the estate. And 
Harold did everything he could to defeat Jamie's Will — a document which this Court has found to 
be a valid testamentary instrument In reality, what Harold sought to do was to effectuate a change 
in who would receive the assets of the estate. While preventing an estate from being distributed 
unlawfully may provide a benefit to the estate, Estate of Foster, 699 P.2d at 646, Harold fought to 
prevent Jamie's estate from being distributed in the lawful manner in which Jamie intended. As 
explained above, Harold's position that attorneys fees should be paid out of the estate to unsuccessful 
will challengers would encourage those who stand to benefit from the rejection of a will to raise even 
the most attenuated challenges to its probate, Harold's reargument of this issue should be rejected. 
D. HAROLD HAS OFFERED NO FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF 
ITS EQUITABLE POWERS TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Without authority, Harold asserts that a fundamental tenant of probate law is that the estate 
should bear the necessary costs of its own administration. Harold goes on to assert that unless he 
is awarded his own attorneys fees, the estate itself will be relieved of any responsibility for its own 
probate costs and that that would be inequitable, (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 5), Harold is 
flatly wrong. 
Attorneys fees may be awarded under the Probate Code under the very specific circumstances 
oudined in §75-3-719- This court has already convincingly ruled that Harold does not qualify under 
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that statute for an award of fees. While Estate of Foster, 699 P.2d at 645, recognizes that the New 
Mexico probate statutes are supplemented by court's inherent equitable powers to award fees, Foster 
also notes that the award of fees under the court's equitable powers "depends on the facts of the case 
and the exercise of equitable power must be used with discretion. An award of attorneys fees is not 
automatic even if there is no dispute about the benefit [provided to the estate]." Estate of Foster, 699 
P.2dat646. 
In his invocation of the Court's equitable powers in this case, Harold has offered nothing 
other than his assertion that it was Jamie's fault that the Will was lost, and that since estates should 
bear the necessary costs of their own administration, it would be unfair for Harold to have to pay his 
own attorneys fees.2 But in every will contest there is an element of fault in the testator's failure to 
effectuate his intent in a manner in which there could be no challenge to the will Under Harold's 
argument, an award of attorneys fees to unsuccessful will challengers would be automatic, for in 
every will contest, the testator (and thus the estate) would have been responsible for causing the 
proceeding. Even if this Court were willing to exercise its equitable powers under a Foster-type 
analysis, there are no facts in this case sufficient to justify overriding the Probate Code's otherwise 
clear instructions about who is entitled to attorneys fees in a will contest3 
2
 Harold also asserts that unless he is awarded his fees, the estate itself will be relieved of 
any responsibility for its own probate costs. (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 5). Harold 
forgets JefFs own (substantial) expenditures in advancing Jamie's Will, which will ultimately be 
paid directly or indirectly from the estate. Under the circumstances of this case, since Jeff is the 
estate's sole heir, what Harold is really asking is that Jeff pay Harold's attorney's fees. 
3
 As Jeff noted in his opposition to Harold's original motion, Harold failed to raise the 
attorneys fees issue in his pre-trial pleadings or at trial. Had he done so, the facts that would be 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
Harold has failed to satisfy Rule 54(b)'s requirements for reconsideration of his original 
motion. As a result, and for the reasons set forth above, Harold's Motion to Reconsider Denial of 
Attorneys Fees should be denied. 
DATED this '32^ay of October, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Jeffrey Paul Hupe 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was hand-delivered on this £a day of October, 1998, to the following: 
Kent B. Alderman, Esq. 
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
PX). Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe 
F:\LESLIDOCT9«\HUPEATTY.REe 
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necessary to defend against (or, indeed, to justify) the exercise of the Court's equitable powers 
could have been explored Having failed to raise the attorneys fee issue until after the trial was 
completed, Harold has waived it 
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In The District Court Of The Third Judicial District 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
J 
£iHJ*.*fi Ifrfi^V Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 
The PlahftifPs Defendant's 
Motion 
Is 
MJL fU.U^^(JAK^h^ 
Granted Denied. 
Comments: 
Plaintiff Defendant To Prepare order. 
DATED ^MJ ,1998. 
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